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I. INTRODUCTION
A successful insanity defense, unlike any other legal defense, carries
with it potentially onerous consequences' that may be less palatable to a
defendant than a conviction itself. While freed of any criminal penalty, the
defendant must suffer the stigma of "criminally insane, 2 must generally
acknowledge that he committed the act charged,' may have to sacrifice
much in terms of trial tactics,4 must usually be committed automatically to
a mental hospital for at least a temporary period of examination,5 must
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I. For a discussion of the consequences of a successful insanity defense see generally German &
Singer, Punishing the Not Guilty: Hospitalization of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 29
RUTGERS L. REv. 1011 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Punishing the Not Guilty]; Singer, Insanity
Acquittal in the Seventies: Observations and Empirical Analysis of One Jurisdiction, 2 MENTAL
DISABIir L. RaP. 406, 407-09 (1978). Among the onerous consequences discussed in these two
articles are the heavy burden placed on defendants in securing their release because of procedural
barriers, most importantly the unavailability to them of administrative discharge by the hospital. In
addition to the likelihood of lengthy hospitalization, other consequences may include maximum
security confinement, therapeutically unnecessary hospitalization and court-imposed restraints after
release.
2. It has been said that an acquitted patient finds himself doubly cursed as both a"criminal" and
a "mental patient." See Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d 607, 610-11 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1010 (1970); United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1073 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969); Chesneyv. Adams, 377 F. Supp. 887, 893 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd, 508 F.2d
836 (2d Cir. 1975); Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome:An Analysis of the Confinement
of Mentally Ill Criminals and Ex-Criminals by the Department of Correction of the State of New York,
17 BUFFALO L. REv. 651, 652 (1968). One court has rather quaintly captured the degree of
stigmatization that attaches to an acquitted patient by designating his class the "insane-insane." See
Reynolds v. Neill, 381 F. Supp. 1374, 1380 (N.D. Tex. 1974), vacatedsub nom. Sheldon v. Reynolds,
422 U.S. 1050(1975).
3. See, e.g., Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 714 (1962); Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d
943,949 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Hill v. State, 358 So.2d 190, 199 (Fla. App. 1978); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236,
344 A.2d 289, (1975). The statement in Krol is typical of statements of this type to the effect that an
insanity verdict "implies a finding that the defendant committed the actus reus." 68 N.J. at 246, 344
A.2d at 295.
4. Courts have often recognized that substantial prejudice may result from the simultaneous trial
on the pleas of insanity and not guilty. Such prejudice can result from two sources: (1) evidence of past
anti-social behavior and present anti-social propensities, and (2) testimony that the crime was a
product of mental disease, (and therefore that the defendant performed the act charged). Holmes v.
United States, 363 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Trest v. United States, 350 F.2d 794, 795 (D.C.
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1018 (1966); People v. Gonzalez, 20 N.Y.2d 289,296,229 N.E.2d 220,
224 (1967) (Scileppi, J., dissenting); Springer v. Collins, 444 F. Supp. 1049, 1059 (D. Md. 1977), rev'd,
586 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 923 (1979).
5. Cases almost unanimously hold that a period of automatic commitment is constitutionally
valid, either as an indefinite commitment, e.g., Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132 (Me. 1971); State v. Kee,
510 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. 1974), or more often for a temporary period of examination pending a
commitment hearing, e.g., Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642,651 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Allen v. Radack, 426 F.
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overcome hurdles to his hospital discharge unknown to the regularly
civilly committed patient 6-which may keep him hospitalized longer than
the time he would have spent incarcerated under sentence-and often,
once released, he must regiment his life according to conditions of
discharge imposed by the releasing court, conditions which may last
indefinitely.7 While barriers to release of acquitted patients are beginning
to tumble,8 release cannot be guaranteed even when a patient produces
Supp. 1052 (D.S.D. 1977); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975); People ex rel. Henig v.
Commission of Mental Hygiene, 43 N.Y.2d 334, 372 N.E.2d 304 (1977). Only two cases are known
which preclude even a temporary automatic commitment, Wilson v. State, 259 Ind. 375, 287 N.E.2d
875 (1972); State ex rel. Kovach v. Schubert, 64 Wis. 2d 612,219 N.W.2d 341 (1974), appeal dismissed,
419 U.S. 1117(1975).
Even though Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962) held that a defendant who did not raise the
insanity defense himself could only be committed civilly, the decision was based upon a construction of
District of Columbia statutes and so is not binding as a constitutional mandate on other jurisdictions.
Therefore, although a persuasive argument can be made that the "criminal commitment" of an insanity
acquittee who has had the defense imposed upon him would be unconstitutional, no case has clearly
reached this result, and in most jurisdictions such acquittees are probably still subjected to
commitment and release procedures which are more burdensome than those applicable to regular
civilly committed patients.
6. Insanity acquittees have historically been labelled as an "exceptional" class of patients and
therefore subject to more stringent standards for release and more lenient standards for commitment
than other civil patients. See, e.g., the recent case of People ex rel. Henig v. Commissioner of Mental
Hygiene, 43 N.Y.2d 334, 372 N.E.2d 304, 306 (1979) retaining that label. Although barriers to release
are beginning to tumble, courts still generally hold that acquitted patients must obtain judicial
approval before they are released, whereas other civil patients are generally eligible for release upon
approval by the hospital staff. This requirement imposes the most serious release problems for these
patients, even where the burden of proof is on the state. See discussion of the release of acquitted
patients in Punishing the Not Guilty, supra note 1, at 1053-74. See also Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F.
Supp. 725 (D. Md. 1977) (holding that differences between commitment and release proceedings for
acquitted patients and others, including different burdens of proof for commitment and release, are not
unconstitutional); Powell v. Florida, 579 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1978) (upholding the requirement of
judicial approval for release). Furthermore, courts will often admit evidence at release hearings that
would be inadmissible elsewhere, such as prior arrest records, e.g, United States v. Snyder, 529 F.2d
871 (D.C. Cir. 1976); State v. Hesse, 117 N.H. 329, 373 A.2d 345 (1977). Thus, a petitioner's entirepast
may follow him into the courtroom when he seeks to leave the hospital. See also Singer, Insanity
Acquittal in the Seventies: Observations and Empirical Analysis of One Jurisdiction, 2 MENTAL Dis. L.
REP. 406,409-10 (1978).
7. See list of states that incorporate conditional release provisions for acquitted patients and
discussion of the use and abuse of conditional release for such patients in Punishing the Not Guilty,
supra note 1, at 1068-73. See also State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382,391-98, 316 A.2d 449,454-58 (1974); Hill
v. State, 358 So. 2d 190,209-11 (Fla. App. 1978).
8. Courts now generally hold that commitment procedures and standards for acquitted patients
must be substantially like those for other civil patients. E.g., Allen v. Radack, 426 F. Supp. 1052
(D.S.D. 1977); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236,344 A.2d 289 (1975); Matter ofTorsney, 47 N.Y.2d 667,394
N.E.2d 262 (1979). More specifically, most courts to which the issue has been presented now hold that
indefinite automatic commitment (i.e., without a hearing) following an insanity acquittal is
unconstitutional. See, e.g., cases cited in note 5 supra; Lee v. Kolb, 449 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
Some hold that at the hearing, the burden must be on the state, e.g., State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236,344 A.2d
289 (1975); contra, In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126,496 P.2d 465, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1972), and at least
two have held that the burden must remain on the state in subsequent periodic review hearings. State v.
Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 390 A.2d 574 (1978); Gibbs v. Helgemoe, 367 A.2d 1041 (N.H. 1977). Only four,
however, have ruled that administrative release by the hospital must be available to acquitted patients
if it is available to regular civil committees, Reynolds v. Neill, 381 F. Supp. 1374 (N.D. Tex. 1974),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Sheldon v. Reynolds, 422 U.S. 1050 (1975); Kanteles v. Wheelock,
439 F. Supp. 505 (D.N.H. 1977); People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511,221 N.W.2d 569 (1974); Wilson
v. State, 259 Ind. 375, 287 N.E.2d 875 (1972), and most courts that have ruled on the issue have held
that administrative release by hospital officials need not be available to acquitted patients even if it is
available to other involuntary patients, e.g., United States v. Ecker, 479 F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and
543 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977); Powell v. Florida, 579 F.2d 324(5th
Cir. 1977); Leev. Kolb, 449 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
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unanimous psychiatric testimony that he is mentally intact and fit for
release as not dangerous. 9 Thus, while the general public perception of the
insanity acquittee is that "he gets away with" the crime, in reality many
persons in this category are penalized by using the insanity defense. It is not
surprising, therefore, that many defendants refuse to rely on it or later wish
that they had not permitted its use.
In addition to the consequences of a successful defense, other sound
reasons may exist for a defendant's refusal to invoke it. These are the
defendant's (I) belief that he is not guilty and therefore is entitled to a full
acquittal; (2) belief that he is not mentally ill and his reluctance to be
labelled as mentally ill; (3) preference to spend time in jail or prison rather
than in a mental hospital; and (4) if his crime is one of political protest, a
belief that an insanity defense will diminish its impact.
Despite the adverse consequences of the defense, which should
indicate to defense attorneys that they should carefully question the
efficacy of its use, courts, prosecutors l° and defense attorneys are often
eager to force the defense on an unwilling defendant or attempt to
influence a naive or passive defendant to rely on it without warning him of
the jeopardy in which it places him."' This too often occurs even when the
crime is minor 2 or when the defendant has other viable defenses on which
he would prefer to rely.'
3
9. See, e.g., United States v. Ecker, 543 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063
(1977); State v. Montague, 510 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Taylor, 158 Mont. 323,491
P.2d 877 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 978 (1972); Hefley v. State, 480 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1972).
10. Frequently, the insanity defense is the result of a plea bargain. Since prosecutors and judges
know that a defendant will probably be incarcerated even if not convicted, they are likely to tolerate, or
even encourage, an insanity acquittal, thereby saving themselves both the time involved in a full trial
and the risk of the defendant's release if he is not convicted. If both prosecution and defense agree to
acquittal on insanity grounds, the jury is ordinarily waived and minimal psychiatric testimony is
presented. It is interesting to note that in at least two jurisdictions that used to have the equivalent of
automatic commitment following a successful insanity defense, the prosecutors raised the defense more
often than the defendants. Prosecutors may have seen the "defense" as a means to lock defendants up
without having their guilt proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See S. RUBIN, PSYCHIATRY AND
CRIMINAL LAW 37-39 (1965); Reid, The Working of the New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal
Insanity, 15 U. MIAM II L. Rav. 14,16,33-34 (1960).
11. Reasons why prosecutor, judge and defense counsel alike may wish a defendant to rely upon
the insanity defense are (1) that it saves court time since a full trial is rarely required, the defendant
having admitted that he performed the act charged; (2) the prosecutor's view that the defendant will
almost certainly be incarcerated without his having to prove him guilty by beyond a reasonable doubt,
and (3) the defense attorney's ability to count the case a "victory" since his client is not convicted. See
discussion of this "conspiracy" in Singer, Insanity Acquittal in the Seventies: Observation and
-npiricalAnalysis of One Jurisdiction, 2 MENTAL DISABILrrv L. REP. 406,413-16 (1978).
12. It is commonly believed that only defendants accused of serious violent crimes defend on
insanity grounds. For example, the former Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, Joseph
Weintraub, believed that the insanity defense was invoked almost exclusively in cases of murder, State
v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 87, 152 A.2d 50, 77 (1959) (Weintraub, J., concurring). This is not true. As
reported in one study of insanity acquittal cases in Essex County, New Jersey, only twelve of forty-six
persons had been acquitted of murder. The study notes that:
There were also 16 persons accused of atrocious assault and battery, 4 of arson, 3 of armed
robbery, 4 of rape or assault with intent to rape, 2 of lewdness, 2 of larceny, 2 of possession of
a concealed weapon, and I of a drug charge (sale of methadone). It should be noted that these
were the crimes charged, not the crimes on which conviction would have been obtained had
insanity not been interposed as a defense. Such charges would probably have been less serious
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It is the purpose of this Article (1) to investigate the duty owed to a
defendant by the court, prosecutor and defense counsel regarding the
possible use of the insanity defense, (2) to answer the question of the
defendant's right to have his wishes regarding the defense respected; and
(3) to suggest the most appropriate (if not the ethically or constitutionally
required) practical approach for defense counsel's handling the case of a
criminal defendant who counsel believes may lack responsibility for the
crime with which he is charged.
II. THE CONCEPT OF COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
Inherent in the concept of competency to stand trial is the idea that a
competent defendant is able and must be allowed to make certain decisions
about his own defense. 14 Thus, he may select his own attorney or decide to
represent himself, 15 decide whether to plead guilty, decide whether to
waive ajury trial, decide whether to testify in his own behalf, and make or
participate in making certain strategic decisions concerning his defense. It
is precisely because of the due process demand that he be able to
participate that his competency is required. In fact, the test of competency
to stand trial is whether the defendant is able to cooperate with counsel,
assist with his own defense, and understand the nature of the proceedings
against him.' 6 Thus, if he is not incompetent, it follows that his
participation is expected. The ability of a defendant to participate in his
own trial is considered "fundamental to an adversary system ofjustice. '' 7
Prime among the decisions to be made by a criminal defendant, with
the advice of his attorney, are the decisions whether to forego trial by
pleading guilty and what defenses to rely on if the case is tried. Since these
in many cases after the plea bargaining process was completed. Also, while such crimes as
atrocious assault and battery sound serious, the actual dangerousness involved in each case
depended upon the specific acts performed. For example, one "arsonist" caused slight
charring to a couch in his apartment. One atrocious assault and battery was the result of a
purse snatching during which the victim was knocked down. Thus, the crimes involved run
the full gamut, and it is likely that many of the defendants would not have received custodial
sentences if convicted.
Singer, Insanity Acquittal in the Seventies: Observations and Empirical Analysis of One Jurisdiction, 2
MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 406, 406-07 (1978). For reported cases concerning persons acquitted of
minor crimes see, e.g., Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962) (writing two bad checks of fifty dollars
each); Tremblay v. Overholser, 199 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1961) (intoxication). See also Overholser,
Criminal Responsibility:A Psychiatrist's Viewpoint,48 A.B.A.J. 527,531(1962).
13. None of this discussion is meant to suggest that there are not appropriate uses for the defense
from the defendant's point of view or that some defendants do not reap substantial benefit from its use,
especially where the crime is serious.
14. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); Silten & Tullis, Mental Competency in
Criminal Proceedings, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1053, 1058-59 (1977); Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81
HARv. L. REV. 454,457-58 (1967).
15. Note, however, that a defendant may be competent to stand trial but be incompetent to
represent himself. Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966).
16. Duskyv. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).




decisions often involve complex and delicate considerations of trial
strategy and are geared primarily to assure the least possible custodial time
for the defendant, it is rare for trial courts to intrude on this attorney-client
decision-making process by raising sua sponte a defense that has not been
claimed and in support of which a defendant has put forth no evidence.'8
Imposition of defenses that the defendant himself has not invoked may
even be unconstitutional,' 9 and the preferable judicial approach is for the
court quietly to ascertain from the defendant whether he has considered,
and voluntarily relinquished, a defense, which may be apparent to the
court but may have been overlooked by defense counsel.2 ° Certainly, it is
not unconstitutional for a court to refuse to impose a defense that a
defendant does not desire.2 '
Only one defense, the insanity defense, is inserted over a defendant's
objections with enough frequency to raise the question whether there are
differences between this defense and others that justify this unusual
approach by trial courts, defense counsel or prosecutors. The inquiry is
begun by a brief examination into the usual role of the trial judge in a
criminal trial.
III. DUTY OF THE COURT
A. The Role of the Criminal Trial Judge
The overriding themes in the role of a criminal trial judge seem to be
that he must protect the essential rights of the accused 22 and see that there
is a just determination of the case.23 In carrying out this role, it is clear that
he need not function as a "mere moderator" of the proceedings, but should
be the "governor of the trial for purposes of assuring its proper conduct
18. Judicial discussions of whether it is proper for a judge to force an unwanted defense on a
defendant are rare. Among the more prominent of these is the discussion by the United States Supreme
Court in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 33 (1970), where, in holding that a guilty plea could be
accepted even though the defendant simultaneously proclaimed his innocence, the Court stated:
[Some courts] have concluded that they should not "force any defense on a defendant in a
criminal case," particularly when advancement of the defense might "end in disaster ... "
They have argued that, since "guilt, or the degree of guilt, is at times uncertain and elusive,
fain accused, though believing in or entertaining doubts respecting his innocence, might
reasonably conclude ajury would be convinced of his guilt and that he would fare better in the
sentence by pleading guilty. . . ." As one state court observed nearly a century ago,
"[r]easons other than the fact that he is guilty may induce a defendant to so plead, . . . [and]
[hie must be permitted to judge for himself in this respect."
(citations omitted). See also Tremblay v. Overholser, 199 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1961), holding that
forcing any defense on a defendant violates due process.
19. See, e.g., Tremblay v. Overholser, 199 F. Supp. 569, 570 (D.D.C. 1961).
20. See, e.g., People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703,717 n.7, 518 P.2d 913,922 n.7, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10
n.7,(1974).
21. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,35 (1970).
22. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,71 (1942); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S.
276 (1930); Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
23. See, e.g., Barba-Reyesv. United States, 387 F.2d 91,93 (9thCir. 1967); Gitelson&Gitelson,
A Trial Judge's Credo Must Include His Affirmative Duty to be an Instrumentality of Justice, 7 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 7 (1966-67) [hereinafter referred to as A Trial Judge's Credo].
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and of determining questions of law. 24 In a criminal trial, this means that
the judge must act with "solicitude for the essential rights of the accused. 25
In protecting these rights, it is generally conceded that he is not limited to
an administrative role of keeping order in the courtroom and keeping the
trial moving, but that he has broad and far-reaching discretion. For
example, he may give jury instructions on issues of law relevant to the case,
even though they are not requested by either party.26 He may appoint
expert witnesses for the court, when necessary to shed light on the truth of
27
a matter. He may question witnesses to elucidate a point that is unclear to
himself or to thejury or to eliminate a misunderstanding. 28 And he may, on
his own motion, strike inadmissable evidence to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. 29 A trial judge oversteps his bounds, however, when he advocates
the cause of either side, intrudes into the lawyer-client relationship,
prejudices a case by overintervention, or abrogates the adversary system
by trying the case for the attorneys. 30 Obviously, he also must take care not
to tread on the constitutional rights of a party. In the following analysis,
therefore, to determine whether a judge functions appropriately when he
imposes the insanity defense on a defendant it will be necessary to examine
whether rights of the defendant are abridged and whether the cause of
justice is truly served by judicial intervention regarding the insanity
defense.
There are several reasons why a trial judge may consider it "just" or
even necessary to advance the defense of insanity, even though the
defendant objects and even though decisions on defense, trial strategy and
plea are at the heart of those that should be left to the defendant. First, a
feeling may persist that even though a defendant is not incompetent to
stand trial or to plead guilty according to strict legal definitions, he
nevertheless is somehow not truly competent to function in his own best
24. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933). The ABA Standards on the proper
function of the trial judge permit some intervention by the judge into the conduct of the case. They
state, in part:
The Trial Judge has the responsibility for safeguarding both the rights of the accused and the
interests of the public in the administration of criminal justice. The adversary nature of the
proceedings does not relieve the trial judge of the obligation of raising on his owninitiative, at
all appropriate times and in an appropriate manner, matters which may significantly promote
ajust determination of the trial ...
ABA PROJECT ON MINIMAL STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE; STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 1.1 (Tent. draft 1972). [Hereinafter referred to as ABA STANDARDS].
But the commentary to this standard warns: "The Judge should be aware that there may be greater risk
of prejudice from over-intervention than from under-intervention." Id. at 27. It may be that in the area
of the insanity defense the caution expressed in the commentary should always be exercised.
25. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942). See also Patton v. United States, 281 U.S.
276 (1930); Lollarv. United States, 376 F.2d 243,245 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
26. See, e.g., People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 716,518 P.2d 913,921, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9, (1974).
27. See, e.g.,A Trial Judge's Credo, supra note 23, at 10.
28. See, e.g., Barba-Reyes v. United States, 387 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1967); ABA STANDARDS, Supra
note 24, Commentary to § 1.1(a) at 26.
29. See A Trial Judge's Credo, supra note 23, at 14.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1945); ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 24, at 26-27,71.
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interests or to make appropriate decisions if he is mentally ill or has been
mentally ill recently. Thus, the mere hint or presence of mental illness is
likely to set a defendant apart as a special species. Second, a trial judge may
believe that an insanity acquittal is the only way or the best way to obtain
treatment for the defendant, either in his own interest or in the interest of
society.3' Third, the court may believe that hospitalization for mental
illness after an insanity acquittal is the only way to incapacitate the
defendant, 2 especially when the crime is minor and the defendant would
not be imprisoned for a long time if convicted. Fourth, the court may
believe that justice is better served if a mentally ill person is not convicted
for a crime for which he is not responsible.33 Fifth, in those cases in which
the defendant wishes to plead guilty, trial courts may rely on the fact that
they are not bound to accept guilty pleas to support imposition of an
insanity defense.
This Article will examine whether any of thesejustifications are in fact
valid. Initially, however, it is necessary to return to the concept of
incompetency to put to rest any suggestion that mentally ill persons are
necessarily a distinct class, not competent to make decisions in their own
best interests. Even if the defendant is mentally ill at the time of trial, he
may well be fully able to function to preserve his own interests. This
concept has long been part of the common law, formulated as the
"presumption of competency. 34
It has also long been legal axiom that even if incompetent in one
specific area, a person may be competent in all others. Thus, persons may
be incompetent to make decisions concerning their property, but not
incompetent to decide matters concerning their persons. They may be
incompetent to make a will,35 or to refuse medical treatment,36 for
example, but be competent for all other purposes. A criminal defendant
may be competent to stand trial, but incompetent to represent himself37 or
to plead guilty.38 Even if a person is so mentally ill as to require
31. See Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the
District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905,938-39 (1961).
32. See Whalemv. United States, 346 F.2d 812,818 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862
(1965); State v. Fernald, 248 A.2d 754,761 (Me. 1968); State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 639, 644,564 P.2d
1154,1156-57(1977).
33. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19,26 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
34. See, e.g., In re Davis, 14 N.J. 166, 101 A.2d 521 (1953); Silten & Tullis, Mental Competency
in Crininal Proceedings, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1053, 1054 (1977). At least one federal court has held that
an irrebuttable presumption of incompetency violates due process, McAuliffe v. Carlson, 377 F. Supp.
896,905 (D. Conn. 1974).
35. See Morgan v. Ivey, 222 Ga. 850, 152S.E.2d 833 (1967); Hamillv. Brashear, 513 S.W.2d 602
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Cornia v. Cornia, 546 P.2d 890 (Utah 1976); In re O'Loughlin's Estate, 50 Wis.
2d 143, 183 N.W.2d 133 (1971).
36. See, e.g., In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282,383 A.2d 785 (Morris Cty. Ct. 1978).
37. Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150(1966).
38. United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211
(9th Cir. 1973); In re Williams, 165 F. Supp. 879, 881 (D.D.C. 1958), modified on other grounds, 259
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982 (1965); Note, Competence to Plead and the
Retarded Defendant: United States v. Masthers, 9 CONN. L. REv. 176 (1976).
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hospitalization, he may be capable of making autonomous decisions for
himself.3 Hospitalized mentally ill patients may retain their civil rights,
such as the right to vote;40 and they may be competent to refuse
psychotropic medication,41 shock treatment,4
2 or medical procedures. 43
The concept of specific incompetency is based on the growing recognition
of the abilities and autonomy of mentally ill persons and the growing
realization that mentally ill persons should not be denigrated by not
according respect to their clear, deeply felt desires. To the extent,
therefore, that a court is motivated to impose an insanity defense on an
unwilling defendant because the judge perceives him to be necessarily less
autonomous or less able to protect his own interests, that reasoning is
supported by neither legal nor psychiatric authority.
B. The Whalem Rule in the District of Columbia
Case law concerning the rights of a defendant who refuses to rely on
an insanity defense that might be available to him is most fully developed
in the District of Columbia, and remains largely undeveloped elsewhere.
Therefore, this discussion begins with four District of Columbia cases, one
of which reached the United States Supreme Court. The first three of these
decisions were by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, while the fourth and most recent case was decided by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
In 1961, the UnitedStates Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia decided Overholser v. Lynch.44 The defendant, Lynch, had been
charged with negotiating two bad checks of fifty dollars each. Believing his
competency to stand trial to be questionable, the trial court sent him for a
mental examination at St. Elizabeths Hospital. When he was returned to
court for trial as competent, the hospital's report alerted the judge that the
defendant probably was not responsible for his crime, since his propensity
to spend more money than he had was a product of his manic depressive
illness. The court therefore refused to allow Lynch to withdraw his not
39. Many states provide by statute that hospitalization raises no presumption of incompetence,
e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5331 (West Supp. 1972); HAWAIU REV. STAT. § 334-57 (1976); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2(c) (1964). See also In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744,747 n.5 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979); cases
cited in notes 40-43 infra.
40. See, e.g., Carroll v. Cobb, 139 N.J. Super. 439, 354 A.2d 355 (App. Div. 1976); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 30:4-24.2a (1975).
41. Eg., Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131
(D.N.J. 1978), supplemented, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 481 F. Supp. 552 (D.N.J. 1979). See Brooks, The
Right to Refuse Treatment, 4 ADMINISTRATION IN MENTAL H. 90 (1977).
42. See, e.g., New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Stein, 70 Misc. 2d 944,335 N.Y.S.2d 461
(Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2d(2). See Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th
Cir. 1973).
43. See generally Annot., Power of Courts or other public agencies, in the absence ofstatutory
authority to order compulsory medical carefor adult, 9 A.L.R. 3d 1391 (1966).
44. 369 U.S. 705 (1962). For the detailed and interesting "back stage" story of the Lynch case by
the lawyer who represented Lynch, see Arens, Due Process and the Rights of the Mentally Ill: The
Strange Case of Frederick Lynch, 13 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 3 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as Arens].
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guilty plea and plead guilty. Over objection of the defendant's counsel,
who made it clear to the court that neither he nor his client wished to rely
upon the insanity defense, the court heard psychiatric testimony, acquitted
Lynch on insanity grounds, and automatically committed him, under a
District of Columbia statute, to St. Elizabeths.
Ruling on Lynch's subsequent petition for habeas corpus, the trial
court held that the commitment was invalid. However, the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, in a six to three decision, holding that a
trial judge has discretion in refusing to allow a "not guilty" plea to be
withdrawn and that in this case the court did not abuse that discretion.45
Furthermore, the court held that neither the defendant nor his counsel has
the absolute discretion to waive an insanity defense since society has no
interest in punishing when there is no blame, and since both society and a
mentally ill offender benefit more from indefinite hospitalization than
from imprisonment. The district judge was correct, said the court of
appeals, in refusing to allow such a person to be branded with a criminal
record.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of
appeals, holding Lynch's commitment invalid on the ground that the
mandatory commitment provision in the District of Columbia statute was
inapplicable to a defendant who had not invoked the insanity defense.
46
Such a defendant may be subject to commitment, if at all, only through
regular civil commitment procedures.47 While the decision was based on
statutory interpretation, the Court also pointed out that the statute's
constitutionality would be in doubt with any other interpretation.48 The
Court did not comment on the question whether a trial court may impose
the insanity defense on an unwilling defendant, since it disposed of the case
on the automatic commitment grounds. By implication, however, it can be
argued that it sanctioned the practice.
The second significant District of Columbia case in this line came in
1962. In Whalem v. United States,49 the defendant had been convicted of
robbery and attempt to commit rape. At trial the insanity defense had not
been raised, the defendant and his attorney having decided against it.
Although the defendant had a background of prior hospitalizations for
mental illness, psychiatric reports done at the time of trial did not support a
probable insanity defense.
45. 288 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
46. 369U.S.at719.
47. Id. at 720. See also Whalemv. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 862 (1965); United States v. Wright, 511 F.2d 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Henry,
600 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Henry went further then Lynch, Whalem or Wright, holding that a
defendant cannot be automatically committed if his own attorney raises the defense over his objection
or, in the absence of any objection from him, without a showing that he agreed to interposition of the
defense by counsel. 600 F.2d at 929.
48. 369U.S.at711.
49. 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862, reh. denied, 382 U.S. 912(1965).
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On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial judge erred in not
imposing the insanity defense on him despite his objections. The United
States Circuit Court rejected the claim, holding that on the facts of his case
there was insufficient evidence to compel the trial judge to invoke the
defense. However, the court seized the opportunity to reiterate its holding
in Lynch that a defendant has no right to keep the defense out of the case in
appropriate circumstances.5° The trial court thus may impose the defense
sua sponte even if neither party has raised it, if it deems it appropriate to do
so after the court has held a hearing on the issue. Again, the court stated
that "in the pursuit of justice" the trial judge has a duty to refuse "to allow
the conviction of an obviously mentally irresponsible defendant." 5' The
court set no standards to control when the trial judge should interpose the
defense, saying only that the decision must be made on a case-by-case
basis.
52
In the third case, United States v. Robertson,53 the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia enunciated certain standards.
In Robertson, the defendant, a black man, had killed a white man in a pool
hall, a killing that seemed purposeless, but which Robertson asserted grew
out of his racial and political feelings against white America. Robertson
was examined by two defense psychiatrists, at least one of whom would
have supported the insanity defense, but at trial he refused to raise it,
against the advice of his attorney, because of his feeling that its use would
dilute the political impact of the killing.54 He had no other likely successful
defense. Robertson's counsel accepted his decision after discussing the
matter with him and did not call his psychiatrists to testify nor did he cross-
examine the psychiatrists called by the prosecutor, who testified during a
hearing called sua sponte by the court under the Whalem doctrine. The
Whalem hearing was held after the first half of a bifurcated trial was
already concluded and Robertson was found to have committed the
murder. The court refused to impose the defense, Robertson was
convicted, and on appeal one of his claims was that this refusal constituted
an abuse of discretion. The court of appeals remanded the case for a
supplemental Whalem hearing on the grounds that the district judge had
not assured that he heard medical evidence in favor of, as well as opposed
to, the defense.55
50. Id. at 818.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 819 n.10.
53. 430 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1977).
54. See Resnick, The Political Offender: Forensic Psychiatric Considerations, 6 BULL. OF Am.
ACAD. OF PSYCH. & L. 388 (1978), advocating that the choice whether to use the insanity defense be left
to the defendant in the case of a "political crime."
55. United States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also United States v.
Snyder, 529 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1976), where the court also remanded for more evidence on the issue of




It was on remand, after the supplemental hearing, 56 that the district
court laid out the criteria on which it relied in continuing to refuse to
impose the defense. Primary among these was the fact that Robertson had
been found competent to stand trial, and that he had strong wishes on the
subject.57
The other factors listed as relevant by the district court were:58 (1) the
quality of the evidence supporting the defense; (2) the "quality" of the
defendant's decision not to raise the defense, including the reasonableness
of his motives in opposing the defense; and (3) the court's personal
observations of the defendant. The court also considered the negative
consequences of an insanity verdict on the defendant and found that
Robertson's decision was rational and competently reached. 9
Although the Lynch- Whalem-Robertson line of cases seems like
strong authority for permitting imposition of the insanity defense by the
court, it should be noted that none of these three cases grapple with the
problems raised by the Whalem rule, but rather rely without analysis on
the too-easy conclusion that insanity verdicts are necessary to do justice
and to protect society. Perhaps for this reason the Whalem rule has not
gone uncriticized by members of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals itself.
Former Chief Judge Bazelon has pointed out that the practice may be
contrary to the Model Penal Code, which, in an earlier draft, had included
a provision permitting a trial judge to sua sponte raise the insanity defense
but which finally omitted this provision as "too great an interference with
the conduct of the defense., 60 Although Judge Bazelon authored the
majority opinion in Robertson, he also issued a separate statement, urging
the court to reconsider the Whalem rule en banc,6' and Judge Wilkey,
dissenting in Robertson, suggested that the Whalem procedure may
violate due process, the sixth amendment's requirement of effective
assistance of counsel, and the entire adversary concept of a criminal trial.62
Other judges on the District of Columbia Circuit have also indicated a
56. The supplemental hearing continued to be necessary on remand, even though on appeal
Robertson had argued that he then wished to rely on the insanity defense, because, once back before the
trial court, Robertson changed his mind again and refused to assert the defense.
57. The court stated:
IThe desires of the defendant concerning presentation of the issue of insanity must be
accorded some weight. While the Whalem opinion holds that a defendant may not in a proper
case prevent the trial court from injecting the issue, the defendant's wishes in the matter "are
highly relevant; and his active opposition renders especially delicate a decision by the court or
counsel to override them."
430 F. Supp. at 447.
58. Id. at 446.
59. Id. at447.
60. See United States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148, 1160 (1974), quoting Comment to Model
Penal Code §4.03 (Tent. draft No. 4,1955).
61. Id.atll6l.
62. Id. at 1165.
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willingness to reconsider Whalem in any future cases that raise the
question of the right of a competent defendant to direct his own defense.63
It is also interesting that despite the Whalem rule, courts in the
District of Columbia seem reluctant to interpose the defense over a
defendant's protest.6 4 No reported District of Columbia decision directs
the trial judge to impose the defense in any particular case. Nor is there any
reported case in which the trial judge exercised his discretion to impose the
defense over defense objections.65
The fourth case, this time from the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, adopts a standard narrower than Whalem but still allows
imposition of the insanity defense in some circumstances. In Frendak v.
United States,66 the trial court had imposed an insanity defense over
63. United States v. Snyder, 529 F.2d 871, 876 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Despite the past doubts about Whalem expressed by various members of the District of Columbia
Circuit, that court, through Judge Bazelon, took the most recent opportunity offered it to strongly
reaffirm that decision, refusing to adopt the Frendak modification as the approach of the District of
Columbia Circuit. See text accompanying notes 66-70 infra for a discussion of Frendak. In United
States v. Wright, - F.2d -(D.C. Cir. April 22, 1980), the defendant, Beachey Wright, had
been sentenced to three years in prison for destruction of government property after he had refused to
rely on an insanity defense.
In a two-day hearing, the trial judge had carefully examined the question whether the defense
should be imposed, after he had obtained court-ordered psychiatric examinations of the defendant and
after he had appointed amicus counsel to make recommendations concerning the insanity issue. All
three psychiatrists had found Wright competent for trial, and two of them had found that he did not
have a viable insanity defense. Wright, who had a past history of psychiatric hospitalizations, had
refused to rely on the insanity defense because he felt that such a defense would dilute the import of his
acts, which had been motivated by his strong religious beliefs, and because he preferred not to be sent to
St. Elizabeth's Hospital, where he had been committed before. The trial court found these reasons to be
rational.
The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial judge had abused his discretion in not imposing the
defense over the defendant's objection. The court of appeals upheld the conviction, finding no such
abuse. It found that the trial court's rationale in not imposing the defense was sound and that the court
had followed the correct procedures in making its determination. Thus, the court of appeals relied
upon the facts that (1) two experts had said the defendant had no substantial insanity defense; (2) the
defendant had agreed with them, indicating that he knew he was breaking the law at the time of his
criminal behavior; and (3) the defendant's reasons for rejecting the defense were rational and two
experts had found that his rejection of the defense was not grounded in mental illness.
The court also indicated that a defendant's choice "may" deserve ultimate deference when the
insanity defense is not strong and that when his reasons for his criminal conduct are political or re-
ligious, his wishes in rejecting the defense should receive special weight.
64. Typical of decisions in this area is another District of Columbia case upholding the trial
court's refusal to override a defendant's wishes on the basis that his wishes are "highly relevant." Cross
v. United States, 389 F.2d 957, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also Patton v. United States, 403 F.2d 923
(D.C. Cir. 1968); Trest v. United States, 350 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1018
(1966) (holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to impose the insanity
defense where such imposition could have jeopardized the defendant's defense on the merits); State v.
Johnston, 84 Wash. 2d 572,527 P.2d 1310 (1974).
65. But see Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979), reversing and
remanding for further hearing a decision (unreported) of the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia which imposed the insanity defense over defense and prosecution objections.
66. 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979).
The Frendak approach was rejected by the District of Columbia Circuit in the recent case of
United States v. Wright, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. April 22, 1980), in which the circuit court
pointed out that Frendak's "voluntary and intelligent" test was not very different from the more
elaborate test of Whalem as interpreted by Robertson, because consideration of the question of the
voluntariness and intelligence of a waiver implicitly requires consideration of the more detailed list of
factors anyway. The more candid position, said the court, is to acknowledge that these factors are to be
considered.
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prosecution and defense objections, after the defendant, Paula Frendak,
having been found competent to stand trial, had been found guilty of first
degree murder and a lesser charge in the first half of a bifurcated trial and
after court-appointed psychiatrists had testified during a court-called
Whalem hearing. This psychiatric testimony had left it unclear whether an
insanity defense would succeed but did raise considerable question as to
Frendak's mental responsibility for the crime. The defendant was
ultimately acquitted on insanity grounds but, under Lynch, ordered not to
be committed except through civil commitment proceedings. Both
defendant 67 and prosecution appealed from this result, challenging the
present validity of Whalem.
Their challenge was based on two United States Supreme Court
decisions, which together, according to Frendak, "stress the importance of
permitting a defendant to make decisions central to the defense., 68 These
cases, discussed in more detail later in this Article, are North Carolina v.
Alford 69 and Faretta v. California,70 holding, respectively, that a judge
may constitutionally accept a guilty plea from a defendant who protests his
innocence, and that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to
represent himself.
The Frendak court decided that while Alford and Faretta did not
render the Whalem rule unconstitutional, Whalem's underlying
philosophy was inconsistent with the philosophy espoused in Alford and
Faretta, which stressed the importance of a defendant's choice. Listing the
possible adverse consequences of an insanity acquittal to a defendant, the
court held that it would not follow Whalem as written, but instead would
modify and interpret it so that a defendant who was competent to stand
trial would have the sole discretion to decide whether to rely on the insanity
defense or whether to waive it so long as he had the specific capacity to
reject the defense. Thus, in effect, the court applied the test of knowing,
intelligent and voluntary waiver to the insanity defense situation, finding
that ability to waive the defense might be something more specific and of a
higher order than simple competency to stand trial.
Thus, Frendak held that a Whalem hearing should still be held when
evidence indicates sufficient question as to the defendant's responsibility
for the crime, but that the judge's discretion is limited so that he can only
impose the defense over a defendant's objection if he finds that the
defendant is incapable of intelligently and voluntarily waiving the defense.
During the hearing the judge must assure himself that the defendant
understands the consequences of his or her decision. The court of appeals
remanded the case for a hearing whether Frendak was competent to make
67. It is not clear why the defendant appealed from this result since she was acquitted of the
criminal charge and in addition was not to be hospitalized as a result of the acquittal.
68. 408A.2dat375.
69. 400 U.S.25(1970).
70. 422 U.S. 806(1975).
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that decision. It seems safe to say that Frendak conforms to the recent
trend of courts to analyze competency of criminal defendants in terms of
the specific decision that they must make, and probably predicts the future
trend in court-imposed insanity defense cases.
C. Other Jurisdictions
While a fewjurisdictions follow the District of Columbia approach set
out in Whalem,71 courts in otherjurisdictions have been reluctant to adopt
Whalem. In United States ex rel. Laudati v. Ternullo,72 the federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York carefully differentiated its
duty to marshal evidence concerning incompetency from its duty
concerning a defense of insanity. Noting the Whalem rule from the District
of Columbia, the court instead decided that when a competent, adequately
represented defendant chooses not to assert an insanity defense, it is not
improper for the court to follow his wishes.
Still another court, the New York Court of Appeals, has upheld a trial
court's failure to interject the insanity defense, saying: "If the trial court
had charged insanity over the defendant's objection, this might seriously
have jeopardized his case. The penalty for assault in the second degree is
not so serious as to ordinarily risk incarceration in a state mental
institution to avoid it."'73 Finally, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia has ruled that it could find no affirmative
71. State v. Pautz, 299 Minn. 113,217 N.W.2d 190 (1974); State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 639,564
P.2d 1154 (1977). See also State v. Fernald, 248 A.2d 754 (Me. 1968) (refusing to allow the defendant to
withdraw a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity after he had entered it); State v. Hall, 176 Neb. 295,
125 N.W.2d 918 (1964); State v. Johnston, 84 Wash. 2d 572, 527 P.2d 1310 (1974). In Hall, the
conviction of a defendant for murder was sustained because the court could point to no way in which
the court's raising the defense on its own had prejudiced the case, when the defendant himself had
introduced evidence of low intelligence in order to try to show that the element ofmens rea was missing.
Additionally, the modified approach of Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. Ct. App.
1979) (discussed at notes 66-70 supra), has been substantially adopted by a New Jersey appeals court,
which found the Frendak formulation "largely persuasive." New Jersey v. Khan, 175 N.J. Super.
I___A.2d (App. Div. 1980). In Khan, the defendant had been ordered tried on
murder charges in a single trial in which evidence of both an involuntarily imposed insanity defense and
self defense was to be presented. In reversing and remanding the case for a new competency
determination as well as a hearing on the issue of imposition of the insanity defense, the court made
clear that certain circumstances might exist, although they would be narrow ones, where a forced
insanity defense would be appropriate. It could be appropriate, said the court, only in the rare case
where a defendant who is competent for trial is not competent to make a knowing, intelligent and
voluntary waiver of his right to assert the defense. However, the court did not elucidate what factors
should guide a trial court in deciding whether to impose the defense on such a defendant. Another
serious weakness in the court's decision was its unexplained holding that if the insanity defense were to
be imposed, the trial should be bifurcated with the insanity defense tried before any substantive
defenses. The reverse should be true; substantive defenses should be tried first so that a defendant has a
chance to clear himself completely and to avoid the stigma and other adverse consequences of an
insanity defense. This is the approach in other jurisdictions where bifurcation has been ordered. See,
e.g., Contee v. United States, 410 F.2d 249, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Robertson, 430 F.
Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1977).
72. 423 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
73. People v. Gonzalez, 20 N.Y.2d 289, 295,229 N.E. 2d 220,223 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
971(1968).
INSANITY DEFENSE
duty on a judge to raise the defense, when the evidence raises a bona fide
doubt as to the defendant's responsibility for the crime.74
Together the cases suggest that a court's duty is, at most, to explore in
a hearing the possibility of an insanity defense when facts seem to warrant
it. The court's discretion not to impose the defense on a reluqtant
defendant is broad and should be used to impose the defense with great
caution. There is no case which holds that the court must impose the
defense over the defendant's wishes even when evidence indicates that the
defense would be successful. If the court does impose the defense, however,
the defendant must be protected by being exposed only to civil
commitment following the trial and by having proper measures taken to
avoid prejudicing any of his substantive defenses.
In some jurisdictions, lack of responsibility for a crime is statutorily
raised by plea rather than as an affirmative defense.75 Case law in these
jurisdictions lends strong support to the notion that reliance on a defense
of non-responsibility must be the personal decision of the defendant.76
The same principles should apply whether or not non-responsibility is
raised by plea or as an affirmative defense since the considerations of
fairness, due process, and the resulting impact on the defendant are the
same. Whether the defense is established under a general plea of "not
guilty" or under the specific plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity" is
irrelevant; "the Constitution is concerned with the practical consequences,
not the formal categorizations of state law." 77
The courts of those states that have addressed the issue whether a
defendant must personally enter an insanity plea have unanimously held
that the choice of the plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity," like any
other plea, is a personal choice of the defendant and not of his counsel or
the court.78
74. Mendenhall v. Hopper, 453 F. Supp. 977,983 (S.D. Ga. 1978).
75. See, e.g., California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016 (Supp. 1979); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. §
552.030(1972).
76. See cases cited at notes 78-86 infra.
77. North Carolina v. Alford,400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). See also Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705,
710 n.6 (1962), in which the Supreme Court indicated that its decision, refusing to impose compulsory
hospitalization on one acquitted on insanity grounds, would be invalid regardless of whether insanity
had been asserted through a plea or by means ofan affirmative defense.
78. People v. Gauze, 15 Cal. 3d 709, 542 P.2d 1365, 125 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1975); People v. Gaines,
58 Cal. 2d 630, 375 P.2d 296, 25 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1962); People v. Hofferber, 70 Cal. App. 3d 265, 137
Cal. Rptr. 115 (1977); Boyd v. People, 108 Colo. 289, 116 P.2d 193 (1941); Anderson v. State, 493
S.W.2d 681 (Mo. App. 1973); State v. Johnston, 84 Wash. 2d 572,527 P.2d 1310 (1974); State v. Dodd,
70 Wash. 2d 513, 424 P.2d 302, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 948 (1967). Only one reported case is known
which may be read for a contrary conclusion. In People v. Merkouris, 46 Cal. 2d 540, 297 P.2d 999
(1956), the California Supreme Court held that the trial court had abused its discretion in allowing a
defendant to withdraw his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. He withdrew it after the issue of
guilt had already been tried in a bifurcated trial so that defendant seemingly had nothing to lose by pro-
ceeding on the insanity issue. He was then convicted and the death penalty imposed. The case is distin-
guished by the later California Supreme Court opinion in Gauze, which says that in Merkouris there
was doubt as to defendant's competence to withdraw the plea~justifying the decision reversing his con-
viction. 15 Cal. 3d at 718, 542 P.2d at 1370, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
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In one case, People v. Vanley,79 the California Court of Appeals
expanded upon the right of the defendant to enter a personal plea. In
holding that a plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity" was invalid and in
reversing the defendant's subsequent commitment to a state hospital, the
court stated that not only must a defendant's plea be made personally in
open court as required by statute in California, 80 but that the record must
reflect that he was aware of the consequences of the plea, including the
length of a possible resulting hospitalization. The court explained the
importance of this understanding by the defendant:
As a matter of common sense, any defendant who pleads guilty to a crime
knows that some punishment will follow; similarly, a person charged with a
prior conviction most likely knows that the purpose of the charge is to
enhance the punishment in some fashion. By contrast, a person who pleads
not guilty by reason of insanity may figure that the plea is simply another way
to "beat the rap." We can hardly impute to the average defendant enough
legal sophistication to realize that the very evidence which establishes the
truth of the plea, can also confine him in a state hospital for a minimum
period of 90 days and that he can remain involuntarily committed at such
hospital for the rest of his life ...
These observations are particularly true in the case of a defendant who
has been returned to court as mentally fit to stand trial. He can hardly be
expected to appreciate that a positive finding of fitness for trial in no way
militates against an equally positive finding of unfitness to be returned to
society. 81
Likewise, in Labor v. Gibson,82 the Supreme Court of Colorado held
that the trial court had no authority to enter an insanity plea over the
objection of a competent defendant. Basing its decision on certain
83Colorado rules and statutory provisions, the court recognized that there
may be good reasons why a defendant and his counsel might not wish to
utilize the defense, and that these reasons should be respected by the court.
Among these would be (1) the possibility that the defendant would spend
more time hospitalized than incarcerated under sentence, (2) the stigma
which attaches to mental illness and (3) trial strategy.84
In another case, the Supreme Court of Colorado stated that a
defendant has the "absolute right" to be tried on a plea of "not guilty." A
plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity" is "in the nature of confession and
avoidance" and may not be forced on a defendant. The court further
79. 41 Cal. App. 3d 846, 116 Cal. Rptr. 446(1974).
80. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1018 (Supp. 1979).
81. 41 Cal. App. 3d at 857, 116 Cal. Rptr. at453 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
82. 195 Colo. 416, 578 P.2d 1059 (1978). See also Boyd v. People, 108 Colo. 289, 116 P.2d 193
(1941); State v. Johnson, 91 N.J. Super. 426,221 A.2d 23 (App. Div. 1966). Johnson held simply that
the trial judge has no duty to hold a hearing to inquire into the defendant's sanity at the time of the
crime where there is no indication that the McNaughton Rule would apply. It did not elaborate on
whether such duty would ever arise.
83. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-103 (1978); COLO. R. CRIM. PROC. 11(e).
84. See also United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154, 1164 (5th Cir. 1974), recognizing the
validity of a defense attorney's refusal to employ the insanity defense based upon trial tactics.
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pointed out that if a defendant is felt to be mentally ill, other statutory
procedures are more appropriately used to see that he gets needed
treatment. 85 And in still another case, the Supreme Court of Washington
held that a defendant had the right, personal to himself, to enter a plea of
guilty, despite advice of his attorney to the contrary.
86
It has also been held that a defendant has the right to withdraw a plea
of "not guilty by reason of insanity." In People v. Redmond,87 the
defendant, charged with assault with a deadly weapon, had been convicted
in the first part of a bifurcated trial of simple assault, a misdemeanor and
the lesser included offense. Since the maximum sentence for this crime was
six months, the defendant tried to withdraw his insanity plea, preferring a
definite short period of incarceration to indefinite hospitalization. The
trial judge refused to allow this in light of the "very, very strong" evidence
in the record of lack of responsibility. In reversing the trial court, the
California Court of Appeals outlined the procedure to be used by a trial
court when there is a genuine issue concerning a defendant's responsibility
for the crime. (1) The trial court should assure itself that the defendant is
competent at the time he seeks to withdraw his plea. (2) If he is found to be
competent, the court should propound questions to him to make a record
in conformance with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama,88 which held
that the basis for findings of voluntary and knowing waiver of the
constitutional rights that are sacrificed by a plea of "guilty" must be spread
on the record. (3) If the court is satisfied that the defendant is making a free
and voluntary choice and appreciates the consequences of his action, then
he should be allowed to withdraw his plea. 89 If there does not seem to be a
genuine issue concerning the defendant's responsibility, the plea should be
permitted to be withdrawn freely.
The approach to insanity pleas taken by these cases appropriately
85. Boyd v. People, 108 Colo. 289,294,116 P.2d 193,195 (1941).
86. State v. Dodd, 70 Wash. 2d 513, 424 P.2d 302, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 948 (1967). The court
stated:
If a person is mentally competent to enter a plea, that is, if he understands his constitutional
rights to process and counsel, confrontation of witnesses, freedom from compulsion to
testify, right to trial by jury, knows the nature of the charge against him, and is capable of
understanding the legal consequences of guilt, then he is free to enter a plea of guilty despite
the advice of his attorney [to plead not guilty by reason ofinsanity].
Id. at 519,424 P.2d at 306. For additional comments concerning competency to plead, as differentiated
from competency to stand trial, see Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Williams, 165
F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1958), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982 (1965); A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRYAND THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYsTEMi 333 (1974); Note, Competence to Plead Guilty:A New Standard, 1974 DUKE
L.J. 149. Sieling states that the standard for competency to plead guilty is whether mental illness had
substantially impaired the defendant's ability to make a reasonable choice among the alternatives
presented to him and to understand the consequences of his plea. 478 F.2d at 214-15.
87. 16 Cal. App. 3d 931,94 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1971).
88. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). It should be noted that Boykin does not insist that a record of probable
guilt be put on the record.
89. This requirement conforms with that of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 11,
that the court may not accept a guilty plea unless it is made voluntarily and with an understanding of
the charge. Furthermore, some state statutes require the court to explain the consequences of a plea to a
defendant before asserting it, see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-7-8.
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parallels the practice in most trial courts concerning acceptance of any
other plea. The ABA Standards on pleas of guilty require that the court
should not accept pleas of guilty or nolo contendere without personally
addressing the defendant, determining that he understands the nature of
the charge and that his plea is voluntary, and informing him of its possible
consequences.9" As Vanley states, it is certainly of utmost importance for
the court to inform a defendant of the serious consequences of an insanity
plea. The court should have the same duty when insanity is interjected as a
defense. The fact that the defendant had counsel should not raise a
presumption that he informed his client of the consequences. 91
D. Weaknesses in the Whalem Approach
None of the rationales generally suggested for imposition of the
insanity defense by the trial court are convincing and there are good
reasons that weigh against permitting the trial court to impose the defense.
Imposition of the defense (1) is more likely to cause injustice than to "do
justice"; (2) creates an exception to the usual rule on competency, which
recognizes the autonomy of the individual and according to which
competent persons can make decisions for themselves; (3) creates an
exception to the usual concept of ability to waive constitutional rights; (4)
violates a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel; (5) is not
necessary to the goal of obtaining treatment for mentally ill defendants;
and (6) is probably not in keeping with a court's discretionary power to
refuse to accept guilty pleas, and certainly is not supported by this concept
when the defendant wishes to plead "not guilty."
1. Imposition of the Defense Does Not "Do Justice"
In the first place, unless the court has a duty to interject other defenses
to protect other innocent defendants, the rationale for the Whalem rule is
92unpersuasive. No reported case seems to hold that there is any judicial
duty to raise any other defense when a defendant objects and certain cases
suggest that imposition of an unwanted defense may be unconstitutional.
The California Supreme Court has stated that when a trial judge
suspects that a defense is available but has been overlooked by defense
counsel, he should question the attorney about it rather than interpose it
himself.93 The court warned that a decision to interpose it sua sponte might
interfere with defense trial tactics. Furthermore, although courts do have
the power to take certain actions on their own motion in the interest of
justice and even if inserting other defenses were among those powers as
90. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMAL STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.4, 1.5 (App. draft 1968). The standards also require thatthejudge be satisfied that
there is some factual basis for the plea. Id. § 1.6.
91. See People v. Vanley, 41 Cal. App. 3d 846,858, 116 Cal. Rptr. 446,454 (1974).
92. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 188 (1973).
93. People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703,518 P.2d 913, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974).
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discussed above, it is suggested here that raising the insanity defense is in a
different category because of its serious and unique consequences, as
outlined in the introduction to this Article. Therefore, "justice" cannot
include the concept that this choice, with its consequences, can be forced
on a defendant against his will. Additionally, if the trial judge is convinced
of a defendant's innocence, on any ground, and is concerned that an
innocent person might be convicted, he can dismiss the case against him, a
route that seems more direct, less meddlesome, and more just.
Finally, if "doing justice" by preventing an "improper" conviction
were sufficient justification for imposition of the defense, the trial judge
would not be given discretion to refuse to raise the insanity defense when
facts point toward its possible viability. The fact that discretion is given
trial judges under Whalem points to the recognition by Whalem itself that
other important interests exist.
2. Faretta, Alford and The Concept of Waiver
It is axiomatic that persons can waive constitutional rights, if the
waiver is knowing, intelligent and voluntary. 94 The right to waive the
insanity defense, whether through a plea of "not guilty" or of "guilty" is
consistent with the concept of waiver of constitutional rights generally.
Two recent United States Supreme Court cases, both relied on by the
district court in Robertson,95 are based on the waiver concept and suggest
support for the right of a competent defendant to control the use of the
insanity defense in his own case. In Faretta v. California,96 the Court held
that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself if
he voluntarily and intelligently elects to waive representation by counsel.97
The Court cited the broad precedent for such a position flowing from the
English common law,98 as well as the many state cases, constitutions, and
statutes99 that create such a right. Finding that the right to make one's own
defense personally is implied in the structure of the sixth amendment, the
Court stated:
94. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (guilty plea); Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238 (1969) (guilty plea); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (waiver of right to counsel).
Zerbst has defined waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege." 304 U.S. at 464.
95. 430 F. Supp. at 447 n.4. Relating those cases, both of which dealt with the waiver of certain
constitutional rights, to a decision to forego reliance on an insanity defense, Robertson stated:
Just as a defendant may elect to forgo representation by counsel and just as a defendant may
enter a plea of guilty for reasons other than his guilt, so too should a defendant who is
competent and whose decision is made rationally and with an awareness of its consequences
be allowed to proceed to trial without introduction of an insanity defense, even though there
may be evidence in the case which could support such a defense.
96. 422U.S. 806(1975).
97. The constitutional right of a defendant to waive counsel in federal court had already been
upheld. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1958). The same standard for waiver applies, namely that of
knowing and voluntary waiver.
98. 422 U.S. at 821-32.
99. Id.
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What were contrived as protections for the accused should not be turned into
fetters ...
When the administration of the criminal law . . . is hedged about as it
is by the Constitutional safeguards for the protection of an accused, to deny
him in the exercise of his free choice the right to dispense with some of these
safeguards . . . is to imprison a man in his privileges and call it theConstitution.)°°
Additionally, the Court pointed out that the sixth amendment speaks of
"assistance of counsel" and interpreted these words literally, labelling
counsel only an "assistant" to the defendant.'1 If a defendant is stripped of
the right to represent himself, his "right to make a defense is stripped of the
personal character upon which the Amendment insists."' 0 2 The fact that
law and tradition allocate to counsel the right to make binding decisions of
trial strategy, said the Court,
can only be justified by defendant's consent at the outset to accept counsel as
his representative. . . . Unless the accused has acquiesced in such
representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed by the
Constitution, for in a very real case it is not his defense.1
0 3
The Court recognized that in most criminal cases the accused can
better defend with counsel's guidance than without it, but also recognized
"the inestimable worth of free choice '' 1°4 and that the right to defend is
personal since the "defendant and not his lawyer will bear the personal
consequences of a conviction."' 105 Thus, said the Court, "although he may
conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must
be honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of
the law.' ,06
It can logically be argued that if a defendant has the constitutional
right under Faretta to represent himself, and under those circumstances
can apparently refuse to interpose the insanity defense on his own behalf,
he must also have the right to refuse to allow his attorney to rely upon it.
Since the defenses on which he relies are "personal" and since it is he who
must suffer the serious consequences of a successful insanity defense (just
as he must suffer the consequences of waiving counsel), it does not seem
reasonable that his counsel can undertake to force those consequences
upon him. Since the seriousness of the deprivation of liberty has been well
recognized in the civil commitment context' 7 and since that liberty cannot
100. Id. at815, quoting Adams v. United States exrel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279-80 (1942).
101. Id. at 820.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 820-21 (emphasis in original).
104. Id. at 834.
105. Id.
106. Id., quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
107. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.
Wis. 1972), vacated on procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473, modified and reinstated, 379 F. Supp. 1376
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be deprived without a full panoply of due process protections, it would be
inconsistent to allow counsel for a criminal defendant to make a decision
that amounts to seeking hospitalization for him, as well as imposing on
him the stigma and hardship of an insanity acquittal.
The second Supreme Court case that supports a defendant's right to
reject the insanity defense despite counsel's advice or the court's contrary
feelings is North Carolina v. Alford,'°8 holding that an accused may
voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly plead guilty for strategical
reasons, despite his continuing assertions of innocence. Alford had
pleaded guilty to a charge of second degree murder in exchange for
reduction of the charge from first degree murder, for which he could have
received the death sentence.
The standard for accepting a plea, said the Court, is whether it
"represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative
courses of action open to the defendant."10 9 The Court pointed to the fact
that there was strong evidence of guilt in Alford's case," 0 but additionally
found persuasive the argument that a defense should not be forced upon a
defendant in a criminal case when advancement of the defense "might end
in disaster.""'
The Court also pointed out that prison sentences are levied on persons
who plead nolo contendere even though such a plea is recognized as not
encompassing an admission of the defendant's guilt, and that such pleas
are accepted by courts without inquiry into defendants' actual guilt. 2
Perhaps most important is the Alford Court's discussion of Lynch v.
Overholser.l '3 The Alford Court interpreted that case as implying that
"there would have been no constitutional error had [Lynch's guilty] plea
been accepted even though evidence before the judge indicated that there
(E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated on procedural grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318
(E.D. Wis. 1976); Davis v. Vatkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Suzukiv. Quisenberry,411 F.




I 11. Id. at 33. The Court stated:
[Slince "guilt, or the degree of guilt, is at times uncertain and elusive, [a]n accused, though
believing in or entertaining doubts respecting his innocence, might reasonably conclude a
jury would be convinced of his guilt and that he would fare better in the sentence by pleading
guilty...."As one state court observed nearly a century ago, "[r]easons other than the fact
that he is guilty may induce a defendant to so plead, ... [and] [hie must be permitted to
judge for himself in this respect."
Id. (citations omitted), quoting McCoy v. United States, 363 F.2d 306, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1966) and State
v. Kaufman, 51 Iowa 578, 580, 2 N.W. 275, 276 (1879).
In an earlier case the Court expressed the same sentiment. In Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269,276 (1942), the Court said:
It hardly occurred to the framers of the original Constitution and of the Bill of Rights that an
accused, acting in obedience to the dictates of self-interest or the promptings of conscience,
should be prevented from surrendering his liberty by admitting his guilt. The Constitution
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was a valid [insanity] defense."' 1 4 The implication is that the principles of
Alford are applicable to waiver-of-insanity-defense situations.
One of these principles is that the standard for accepting the
defendant's decision on his plea is not whether he is in fact guilty, but
whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice by him.
Another is that trial strategy has a legitimate role to play in a defendant's
determination of his plea and that when this is a basis for his decision, it is
entitled to great respect by the court. A third principle to be gleaned from
Alford is that as long as the plea is voluntarily and intelligently made, it is
not unconstitutional for the judge to accept it. In fact, states may
statutorily confer the absolute right to plead guilty under such cir-
cumstances.' 15 The case can also be read for the proposition that there
must be a factual basis for a guilty plea only when that plea is accompanied
by claims of innocence. Thus, under even a restrictive reading of the case, a
defendant wishing to waive a viable insanity defense would not have to
demonstrate a factual basis for his sanity ' 6 to have a guilty plea accepted,
unless at the same time that he pleaded guilty, he proclaimed his innocence.
Finally, although Alford may possibly be read for the proposition that
judges may under proper circumstances refuse to accept guilty pleas when
strong evidence of guilt is absent, it cannot be read for the proposition that
judges may prevent defendants from pleading "not guilty" (instead of "not
guilty by reason of insanity").
Both Faretta and Alford are consistent with the prevailing law that
persons, including criminal defendants, can waive their constitutional
rights so long as the waiver is the result of the person's free and intelligent
choice. As stated by one commentator: "This standard stresses the
consensual, 'free choice' character of waiver and its ultimate reliance upon
the individual's freedom to forego benefits or safeguards through the
uncoerced exercise of his rational facilities.17 Constitutional safeguards
have, in fact, consistently been held to be subject to knowing and
intelligent waiver. To permit the court to impose the insanity defense on an
unwilling defendant is to carve out a special exception from the general
114. 400 U.S.at35.
115. Id.at38n.lI.
116. The requirement that he has to prove his sanity simply because some evidence exists which
shows that he might have a legitimate insanity defense is contrary to the common law presumption of
sanity. See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895). It is because of this presumption that
defendants in many jurisdictions have to prove their insanity in order to be successful with the insanity
defense, see, e.g., LeLand v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (Oregon); Duisen v. Wyrick, 566 F.2d 616
(8th Cir. 1977) (Missouri); State v. DiPaglia, 64 N.J. 288, 293-94, 315 A.2d 385 (1974), or at least
submit evidence of his insanity in order to cast the burden of proving his sanity on the prosecution.
Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895). Requiring the defendant to prove his sanity beyond all
doubt in order to save him the undesired consequences of a successful insanity defense places an
impossible burden upon him. It also reverses the usual role of defense and prosecution in the criminal
trial, or if the parties refuse to accept this role reversal, casts upon the court the burden of gathering the
evidence and entering it on the record, thereby disrupting the court's usual neutral role.




waiver concept, which heretofore has not been narrowed even when the
right waived is critical, such as the right to appeal from a death sentence.
18
While the most recent case of Frendak v. United States,"9 discussed
above, represents a great advance over Whalem in its emphasis on the
defendant's free and knowing choice as the pivotal element in a court's
decision to interject the defense into a case, the Frendak solution is still not
entirely satisfactory. It is not clear, for example, why a judge should have
the discretion to force an insanity defense on a defendant whom he finds
lacking the ability to waive it. When a decision is so basic in defense
planning and goes so much to the core of trial strategy, it would be
preferable to attempt to return the defendant to complete competence,just
as attempts are made to return defendants to general trial competence,
before making the insanity defense decision for him. Especially when this
type of "complete competency" can be attained quickly or when the
defendant is willing to accept the consequences of a reasonable trial delay,
this approach should be used. Since the ability to make decisions
concerning the insanity defense are so central to the defense case and
because the consequences of an insanity acquittal are so personal to the
defendant, incompetency specific to this area should be treated just like
general incompetency to stand trial.
It is also not clear why, as implied by Frendak, the trial judge should
always exercise his discretion to invoke the insanity defense for a
defendant who is competent to stand trial but incompetent to waive the
defense for himself. It seems preferable for the court to use a type of
"substituted judgment" analysis, as used in other areas of incompetency, 20
if the trial is to go forward. Under this approach the court would attempt to
place itself in the place of the defendant and make the decision that it
believes he would make if he could. The court thus would consider factors
such as (1) the seriousness of the crime; (2) the likely penalty if convicted;
(3) the defendant's views of psychiatric hospitalization before he became
incompetent, if known; (4) the rationality of any reasons he gives for
declining the defense; as well as (5) the likely strength of the insanity
defense and (6) availability of other defenses.
If defendants are not to have the absolute right to wait to become
competent to waive the insanity defense and, once competent, the absolute
right to then waive the defense, the strongest case for its imposition on an
unwilling defendant would be the case of a defendant (1) who is competent
to stand trial (2) but not competent to waive the defense, (3) when
competency to waive is not likely to return in the foreseeable future, (4)
when the crime is extremely serious, and (5) when no other defenses are
realistically available. Under these specific circumstances, if any judicial
118. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012(1976).
119. 408A.2d364(D.C.Ct.App. 1979).
120. See, e.g., InreBoyd,403 A.2d 744 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979).
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discretion is to be permitted, it may be that a court could reasonably strike
a balance in favor of imposing the defense, since the defendant would be
placed in minimal jeopardy, the state has a legitimate interest in bringing to
trial a defendant otherwise competent to stand trial, and the defendant is
not likely to be able to protect his own interests better in the foreseeable
future. Absent these specific circumstances, however, the situation is not
so compelling as to preclude a criminal defendant's usual right to waive
rights available to him.
3. The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
The accused's right to enter a guilty plea or choose his own defenses is
intimately connected with his sixth amendment right to counsel. His
attorney may have advised him to sidestep an insanity plea or defense in
order (1) to avoid a public trial; (2) to obtain a lighter sentence; (3) to avoid
hospital confinement; or (4) for other tactical reasons. If the court refuses
to accept this decision, it compromises the defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel 21 because it negates and overrides any expert advice
counsel has given.
4. Obtaining Treatment for the
Mentally fIl Defendant
This rationale for imposition of the insanity defense is not sound for
several reasons. Since, under Lynch, hospitalization may not be imposed
on an insanity acquittee unless he has raised the defense himself, its
imposition by the trial judge is no longer a feasible mechanism to assure
hospitalization for a mentally ill defendant in the jurisdictions that follow
Lynch.122 In addition, as the Lynch Court pointed out, if hospitalization is
called for to protect the public and treat the defendant, other more
appropriate routes are available, either through civil commitment if the
defendant is acquitted, or by transfer from prison to mental hospital, if
convicted. 123 The insanity defense should not be permitted to be turned
121. In other contexts, courts, including the District of Columbia Court of Appeals which
decided Whalem, have cautioned against intervention by the judge into the defense function. For
example, in a recent inquiry into the competency of defense counsel in his investigation of a criminal
case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated that a court
must be wary lest its inquiry and standards undercut the sensitive relationship between
attorney and client and tear the fabric of the adversary system. . . . For the law to encourage
a wide-ranging inquiry, even after trial, into the conduct of defense counsel would undercut
the fundamental premises of the trial process and transform its essential nature. The resulting
upheaval in the role of the trial judge, widely recognized as a serious difficulty, would in itself
call into question any broad doctrine of ineffective assistance. . . . An even more difficult
problem would be posed by the supervision of defense counsel's development of the case
before trial. Even ifive had the authority it would be unwise to embark upon a doctrine that
would open the door to afundamental reordering ofthe adversary system into a system more
inquisitorial in nature. The adversary system, warts and all, has worked to provide salutary
protection for the rights of the accused.
United States v. Decoster, 48 U.S.L.W. 2070, 2071 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1979) (emphasis added). This





into a tool of preventive detention. 124 Finally, it cannot be presumed that a
defendant who was mentally ill at the time of the crime is still mentally ill
and in need of treatment at the time of trial.1
25
5. Discretionary Judicial Rejections
of Guilty Pleas
Courts sometimes justify imposing an insanity defense on a defendant
who wishes to plead guilty by stating that courts have no duty to accept
guilty pleas.126 Obviously, this rationale is irrelevant if the defendant
wishes to go to trial relying on a different defense, rather than to plead
guilty.1 27 But it must be questioned whether this rationale is even helpful in
justifying refusals of guilty pleas, which are rejected simply because an
insanity defense is possible.
Although it is true that the court may have "no obligation" to accept a
guilty plea and that a defendant has no constitutional right to plead
guilty, 28 the court's only real consideration in this regard should be
whether the plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered.12 9 All the
requirements of rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
130
concerning acceptance of guilty pleas are included to allow the judge to
evaluate one factor-voluntariness of the plea-and to establish a record
upon which the plea is more likely to withstand collateral attack. 3' Even
the rule 11 requirement that the judge assess whether there is a factual basis
124. See note 182 infra.
125. See extended discussion of the reasons why the automatic commitment of a person
acquitted on insanity grounds is poor policy, if not unconstitutional, in PUNISHING THE NOT GUILTY,
supra note 1, at 1017-25.
126. E.g., State v. Fernald, 248 A.2d 754,760 (Me. 1968). See also Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S.
705, 719 (1962).
127. A defendant has a constitutional right not to plead guilty. United States v. Jackson, 390
U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
128. Santabello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,262 (1971); Visconti v. United States, 454 F. Supp.
417 (D. Mass. 1978).
129. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,31 (1970); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459
(1969); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). Contra, Lynch v. Overholser, 288 F.2d
388,391 (D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'don other grounds, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
130. Rule I 1 reads, as relevant:
(d) Insuring That the Plea is Voluntary. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court,
determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises
apart from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's
willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior discussions between the
attorney for the government and the defendant or his attorney.
(e) Plea Agreement Procedure ....
(f) Determining Accuracy of Plea. Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty,
the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall
satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea.
(g) Record of Proceedings. A verbatim record of the proceedings at which the
defendant enters a plea shall be made and, if there is a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the
record shall include, without limitation, the court's advice to the defendant, the inquiry into
the voluntariness of the plea including any plea agreement, and the inquiry into the accuracy
of a guilty plea.
131. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969); Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S.
831,831(1969).
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for a guilty plea is designed solely to assure that the defendant understands
the relationship of the law to the facts, an understanding without which the
Supreme Court has said there can be no voluntary guilty plea. 132 Thus,
although stated separately from the voluntariness requirement in rule
11,133 the factual-basis requirement is not one apart from voluntariness; it
is an inherent part of the voluntariness requirement. It is not set up to
assure, as some courts have stated, 134 that an innocent person is not
convicted, but rather is meant to assure that the waiver of the various rights
that occurs when a guilty plea is entered 135 is done knowingly and
voluntarily.
Thus, the requirement that a court ascertain if there is a factual basis
for the plea does not mean that the court must be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty or would be convicted.136 Nor
does it mean that the defendant must have no possible legal defense upon
which to rely,137 since a guilty plea by its very nature necessarily is a waiver
of all defenses. 3 1 It also does not mean that a defendant's voluntary and
competent decision to plead guilty for tactical reasons should be
overridden by a judge, since tactics are recognized as a valid reason for
waiver. 3 9 It means simply that there must be a factual basis for believing
that the defendant was implicated in the criminal act charged or, in other
words, that his conduct was within the ambit of that defined as criminal.14
0
The judge should also be sure that the defendant knows what the elements
132. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. at 466-67; See also Carreon v. United States, 578 F.2d
176, 179 (7th Cir. 1978); Sassoon v. United States, 561 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1977); Rizzo v. United
States, 516 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1975).
133. Since McCarthy was decided, rule 11 has been amended. However, the factual-basis
requirement was stated separately under the old rule I I also, and so the Supreme Court's standards in
McCarthy are presumably still valid. For cases decided since the rule amendment, citing McCarthy for
the fact that the factual-basis requirement goes to voluntariness, see cases cited in note 132 supra. For
the text of the old rule 11, see McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. at 462 n.4.
134. See, e.g., Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 369
U.S. 705 (1962); United States v. Romanello, 425 F. Supp. 304 (D. Conn. 1975).
135. The rights waived by entry of a guilty plea are the rights to a jury trial, to confront one's
accusers, to present witnesses in one's defense, to remain silent, and to be convicted byproofbeyonda
reasonable doubt. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 (1971) (Douglas, J. concurring). See also
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459,466 (1969).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Neel, 547 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Webb, 433 F.2d
400 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 958 (1971).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208,221 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013
(1975); Eaton v. United States, 458 F.2d 704 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
138. Eaton v. United States, 458 F.2d 704 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972);
McDonald v. United States, 437 F.2d 1251, 1252 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Lucia, 416 F.2d 920,
923 (5th Cir. 1969), opinion withdrawn in part on other grounds, 423 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971). It does not matter that a defense might be asserted successfully at trial; it is
waived by a plea of guilty, Eaton v. United States, 458 F.2d at 707.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013
(1975). Recognizing that a defendant may plead guilty out of various motives other than guilt itself,
courts have stated that a defendant "may elect to sacrifice himself' for such motives. United States v.
Webb, 433 F.2d 400,404 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 958 (1971).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Vera, 514 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1975).
INSANITY DEFENSE
of the charge are and, if a defense is evident that the defendant will waive by
entering a guilty plea, that he knows he is waiving it.1
41
In addition, as numerous courts have made clear, a trial judge should
accept a guilty plea unless there is good reason for rejecting it.'
42
Presumably, this means that lack of voluntariness has been shown.
The requirement that a factual basis for the plea be apparent on the
record is not a constitutional requirement.143 It is not meant to create an
exception to the usual rule that defendants may waive constitutional
rights. It is only meant to provide additional assurance that a guilty plea is
voluntary and will not be vulnerable to collateral attack. 144 Viewed in this
light, ajudge's discretionary power to reject a guilty plea does not support
the ideas either that he may reject such a plea simply because an insanity
defense is possible or that he may go further and impose the defense upon
an unwilling defendant.
E. A Proposal
The above discussion leads to the following proposal for the approach
to be adopted by a court which is faced with a defendant who refuses to rely
upon a possibly viable insanity defense. If the defendant has been found
incompetent to stand trial, the issue must be held in abeyance; no trial can
be held and therefore no defense imposed. Therefore, the issue should
only arise if the defendant is competent to stand trial.
If the defendant is competent to stand trial and refuses to rely upon a
seemingly sound insanity defense, the court should hold a hearing on (1)
whether the defendant really does have a strong insanity defense; (2) if so,
whether the defendant's waiver of the defense is a knowing and voluntary
one; (3) if not, whether he should not be tried until he gains the ability to
knowingly and intelligently decide the issue of his defense; and (4) if not,
whether, using the substituted judgment test the court should interpose the
defense for him. Prior to the hearing, the court can and generally should
appoint an amicus defense counsel to investigate the issues to be presented
141. See, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 405 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1968); McCoyv. United States,
363 F.2d 306, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Along these same lines, a trial judge always should consider
seriously accepting a tendered plea of guilty, United States v. Bednarski, 445 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1971),
and can abuse his discretion in not accepting it. See, e.g., United States v. Navedo, 516 F.2d 293 (2d Cir.
1975); United States v. Martinez, 486 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1973); Griffin v. United States, 405 F.2d 1378
(D.C. Cir. 1968). Also, the caution to be exercised on the occasion of accepting a guilty plea bears direct
proportion to the gravity of the charge, see, e.g., United States ex rel Miner v. Erickson, 428 F.2d 623
(8th Cir. 1970). This suggests that especially where the charge is relatively minor, and the defendant
voluntarily admits his involvement in the act charged, the trial judge may abuse his discretion in not
accepting a guilty plea tendered for tactical reasons, thereby forcing a possibly lengthy hospitalization
upon the defendant.
142. See, e.g., Carreon v. United States, 578 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1978); People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal.
3d 703, 518 P.2d 913, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974).
143. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969). The factual-basis requirement
was added to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1966.
144. See note 131 and accompanyingtextsupra.
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in the hearing, and, if he deems it advisable, to present any arguments
which there may be in favor of use of the insanity defense. Amicus counsel,
as part of his investigation, may seek the appointment of a psychiatrist to
examine the defendant, or the court may appoint a psychiatrist on its own
initiative to report directly to the court.
If the court finds that in fact the insanity defense would be weak or
insubstantial, it need go no further in considering the issue and should
permit the case to go to trial absent an insanity issue. However, if the
defense seems to be a strong one, the court must then decide if the
defendant's refusal to rely on it is knowing and voluntary.
If the court reaches the opinion that the defendant's waiver is knowing
and voluntary, no insanity defense may be imposed. Factors to be
considered by the court in reaching this determination are (1) the
rationality of the defendant's stated reasons for rejecting the defense and
(2) any psychiatric opinion as to whether these reasons are the product of,
or influenced by, a mental illness. Significantly bearing on the rationality
of the decision are such other factors as the seriousness of the crime
charged and consequent seriousness of the penalty to which the defendant
would be exposed if convicted, the availability of other defenses to the
defendant, any political or religious motivations for avoiding the defense
which may exist, the defendant's feelings about psychiatric hospitalization
versus his feelings about penal incarceration, and the presence or absence
of past hospital experiences which may be determining these feelings,
whether trial tactics of the defendant are likely to be impaired by the use of
the defense, and other adverse consequences of an insanity acquittal to the
defendant.
If the waiver by the defendant is found not to be knowing and
voluntary, the court should in most cases postpone the trial of the matter
until the defendant becomes competent to make the decision. Factors in
this decision may include the length of time during which the defendant has
been under psychiatric treatment and the length of time which is likely to
be required to return him to full competency. It may be that he is
considered unlikely ever to reach a condition in which he can make the
decision knowingly and voluntarily, either because he refuses to take the
necessary psychotropic medications, because his condition is not
susceptible to improvement by more treatment, or for some other reason.
His wishes on the subject of a delayed trial should also be considered as
should any effect which a substantial delay will have on the state's ability to
bring him to trial.
If the court decides that the trial should not be delayed because delay
is not likely to improve the defendant's condition or for another reason, it
must then decide the ultimate issue of whether to interpose the defense for
the defendant. This decision should not have to be made often if the above
procedure is followed. However, when it must be made, the court should
use the "substituted judgment test," (discussed in Section III. D. of this
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Article), which asks what the defendant himself would do, if he were
competent to decide this question.
In making this decision, the key factor is whether the defendant has
held strong opinions on the subject over a long period of time, including
times when he was fully competent. In other words, if it is known what his
competent decision would be, that decision must govern. If no such clear
guideline exists, the court must perform the analysis which it feels the
defendant, if competent, would perform and weigh the relevant factors
to reach a rational decision for him. These include the seriousness of the
crime, the availability of other defenses, and the consequences to the
defendant both of a conviction and an insanity acquittal.
Finally, if the court decides to inject the defense into the case, it should
continue the appointment of amicus defense counsel to present it, since the
defendant's own attorney has no duty to interpose it under these
circumstances. The court should also bifurcate the trial if other substantial
defenses exist which may be prejudiced by the contemporary presentation
of the insanity defense. The substantive defenses should be presented first,
and only if these are unsuccessful should evidence of lack of responsibility
for the crime be introduced. Doubts should be resolved in favor of
bifurcation.
IV. DUTY OF DEFENSE COUNSEL
A. Raising the Insanity Defense
Few cases discuss the subject of defense counsel's duty or right to raise
any specific defense, including that of insanity,145 over the defendant's
objections. Nevertheless, the issue is a critical one because defense lawyers
commonly confuse the issues of incompetency to stand trial and
responsibility for crime, assuming that when they are dealing with
mentally ill defendants both issues automatically arise and both must be
handled in a uniform manner.
The responsibility of the lawyer in raising the incompetency issue is
clear. As an officer of the court, he has a duty to bring doubts of his client's
competency to the court's attention with or without his client's per-
mission. 146 Although there is no clear statement in the case law concerning
the lawyer's duty to raise the defense of non-responsibility in the face of
client opposition, no case holds or even states in dictum that he should do
so. Nevertheless, attorneys are likely to be influenced by many of the same
145. See Chernoff& Schaeffer, Defending the Mentally Ill: Ethical Quicksand, 10 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 505, 524-27 (1972); but see Brunnig, The Right of the Defendant to Refuse an Insanity Plea, 3
BULL. OF AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIAT. & LAW 238 (1975), tentatively reaching a contrary conclusion. For
general discussions of the line of demarcation between a client's right to make decisions in his case and
his lawyer's right to make decisions for him, see D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN
CHARGE? (1974); Chused, Faretta and the Personal Defense: The Role of a Represented Defendant in
Trial Tactics, 65 CAL. L. REV. 636 (1977); Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed
Consentandthe Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 41 (1979).
146. See Patev. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
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considerations that influence trial courts to impose the defense.147 To the
extent that those reasons are invalid for trial courts, they are at least as
invalid as justification of a defense attorney's like actions.
Of the relevant cases, United States v. Robertson148 is illuminating,
even though it does not specifically rule on the attorney's duty to raise the
insanity defense. Implicit in its discussion is the lack of any such duty. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated that when, under the
Whalem procedure, the trial court imposes the defense over the
defendant's wishes, trial counsel is not bound, even then, to present the
defense to the court. Rather, the court suggested that the appointment of
amicus counsel would be one way of assuring presentation of the evidence
on insanity 149 so that defense counsel could remain loyal to a client's
wishes.
Other federal courts have affirmatively indicated that an attorney is
not bound to invoke the defense over his client's objection. In the Third
Circuit case of Martin v. Brierley,150 the court refused to declare defense
counsel's representation inadequate for not invoking or even considering
the insanity defense when the defendant had over a period of time clearly
and consistently disapproved its use. The court stated: "We think that it
would have been a meaningless gesture for his trial counsel to have made
the suggestion of an insanity defense to him merely in order to give him the
opportunity to reject it." 5'
Likewise, in James v. Boles,152 the court indicated that trial counsel
was not bound to raise the defense even when the defendant had been
recently hospitalized for mental illness, since the defendant did not want it
raised and trial tactics may have dictated that it would prejudice a
substantive defense. And in Snider v. Cunningham,'53 in which the
defendant sought to establish an alibi defense, the court stated that "a
prisoner who insists that he did not commit a crime can hardly be forced by
his counsel to confess in order to support a tenuous defense of insanity."' 54
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals has indicated in dictum
that a defense attorney has no duty to raise the insanity defense if, as a
matter of strategy, he or his client decides against it. In the case of apro se
defendant who challenged his conviction in part on the ground that the
trial court had not sua sponte raised the insanity defense, the court stated:
If [the defendant] had been represented by an attorney who failed to raise the
defense of insanity, it would be simply assumed that he had consulted with his
147. See Part III supra.
148. 430F. Supp.444(D.D.C. 1977).
149. United States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
150. 464 F.2d 529 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
151. Id. at 530.
152. 339 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1964).
153. 292 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1961).
154. Id. at 685.
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client, who was unprepared to risk being confined to a State mental
institution. Where a sane person similarly refuses to raise such a defense on
his own behalf, it should ordinarily be assumed that he waived it.'
The thrust of this language is that a competent defendant's decision not to
risk state hospital confinement should be honored by both the court and
defense counsel, regardless of whether an insanity defense might be viable.
These decisions are consistent with general thinking on counsel's role
in a criminal trial. Some decisions on the strategy of a criminal trial remain
in the lawyer's domain, but certain basic decisions are the client's to make.
While the boundary line between trial strategy and basic decision-making
is often fuzzy, it is clear that decisions as to plea, whether to waive a jury
trial and whether to testify in his own behalf, belong to the client after
receiving advice from defense counsel. 156 The American Bar Association in
its project on standards for criminal justice has stated: "A lawyer should
take care to consult with his client to the extent feasible on all matters
affecting substantial rights." 57 Two indicia regarding which area a defense
decision falls in are: (1) does the decision require special skill, training or
experience that the lawyer has and the client does not, as with evidentiary
questions, for example?' 58 -if so, it is more likely to be a "trial strategy"
decision for the lawyer to make; (2) does it affect fundamental
constitutional rights of the accused?-if so, it is within the range of
decisions to be made by the client, since he must bear the brunt of the
decision. The decision concerning the insanity defense should belong to the
client according to both of these criteria. 5 9
Since a decision on the insanity defense affects "substantial rights," in
that success with the defense may result in a substantial period of
incarceration, it can be persuasively argued that not only must the attorney
consult carefully with his client concerning this issue, but that this decision
is akin to the decision of how to plead and belongs to the client alone. This
conclusion seems warranted since success with this defense will lead to
incarceration, is stigmatizing, and, in any event, because it leads to serious
consequences for the client, it is quite different from a "not guilty" finding
based on any other defense. Certainly it has the practical effect of being
155. People v. Gonzalez, 20 N.Y.2d 289,294,282 N.Y.S. 538, 542,229 N.E.2d 220,223, (1967).
156. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENSE FUNCTION. § 5.2(a) (Approved draft 1968).
157. Id. at 241 (Comment to § 5.2). The ABA Standards concerning the defense function also
state that defense counsel may not conclude a plea agreement without the consent of the client and that
it is counsel's role not to decide but rather to advise the client, after a thorough investigation, so that his
decision will be well-informed. Id. § 3.2. Such information, states the commentary, should include that
concerning collateral consequences of the conviction. Id. at 71.
158. Seeid.at239-40.
159. Without analysis, however, the courts of at least one state, Maryland, have held that the
question of whether an insanity defense should be raised is a matter of trial strategy to be determineby
defense counsel after consultation with the client, White v. State, 17 Md. App. 58,299 A.2d 873 (1973),
and may be raised even over objections of the client, List v. State, 18 Md. App. 578, 308 A.2d 451
(1973), vacated as moot, 271 Md. 367,316 A.2d 824 (1974). See also State v. Hermann, 283 S.W. 2d 617
(Mo. 1955).
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tantamount to an admission by the defendant that he committed the crime
Therefore, it has the added disadvantage of increasing the likelihood of
conviction if unsuccessful. For these reasons, the decision on the insanity
defense is one of the most critical to be made in the course of the case and
rises above one encompassed in the term "trial tactics."'1 60
Not only would defense counsel's imposition of the insanity defense
over his client's objection intrude on his client's right to control critical
aspects of his own case, but additional reasons militate in favor of placing
the insanity defense decision in the defendant's hands. Placing the decision
with the attorney is likely to lead to violating the attorney-client privilege.
By necessity, the attorney who is arguing for an insanity defense must
disclose information persuasive of mental instability that has been
revealed by the client to him. 16' At its worst this information might include
direct evidence of guilt, as, for example, details of the commission of the
criminal act. The situation also is likely to necessitate production by the
defense attorney of psychiatric testimony only available as the result of a
defense-obtained psychiatric examination. Testimony by the defense's
psychiatrist falls within the ambit of the confidential attorney-client
relationship since the psychiatrist is an agent of defense counsel. 1
62
Another factor in favor of placing the decision ultimately with the
defendant is that a lawyer may not waive a constitutional right of a
client. 163 Since it can be argued that the imposition of the insanity defense
on an unwilling client is almost certain to result in at least some period of
involuntary hospitalization, this decision by the attorney can be seen as a
forbidden waiver of the defendant's right to liberty, characterized by the
Supreme Court as "an interest of transcending value."'
164
The question can be asked whether the rationale of Lynch v.
Overholser165 in refusing to allow the "criminal commitment" of a
defendant on whom the insanity defense has been judicially imposed
should be extended to the defendant whose own lawyer has either
disregarded his wishes or not solicited his opinion before invoking the
defense. Recently, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has extended
the holding of Lynch to the case in which trial counsel raised the insanity
defense either over a defendant's objection or without his knowledge of
and acquiescence in its use. 166 In such cases, said the court, the defendant
160. Complete disregard of a client's wishes on this subject or failure to consult him could lead to
legitimate claims of incompetency of counsel at a post-trial relief proceeding or on appeal.
161. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY E.C. 4-5 (1979).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036,1046 (3d Cir. 1975); Statev. Kociolek, 23
N.J. 400, 129 A.2d 417 (1957).
163. See, e.g., Brockhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1,8(1966) (Harlan, J. concurring).
164. Speiserv. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,525 (1958).
165. 369 U.S. 705(1962).
166. United States v. Henry, 600 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The issue whether defense counsel
may impose the defense on a client was not raised or discussed in this case. The defendant was
challenging his five year old commitment that followed an insanity acquittal on the ground that he had
not agreed to use of the insanity defense. The record did not show whether his attorney had actually
raised the defense and, if he did, whether the defendant realized that he was doing so.
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cannot be automatically committed, but any hospitalization that he may
undergo may only be obtained by the use of regular civil commitment
procedures.
B. Duty to Investigate the Insanity Defense
Although defense counsel may have no duty to raise an insanity
defense, a defense attorney does have a well-defined duty to investigate a
possible insanity defense167 and discuss it with his client when facts seem to
point toward its possible use. His failure to perform the duty places the
case in jeopardy if later challenged on grounds of incompetence of
counsel. 16
8
In one thorough discussion of this duty, the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland granted a prisoner's petition for a writ
of habeas corpus and reversed his conviction, finding incompetence of
counsel when the defense attorney had been aware of facts that pointed
toward presentation of an insanity defense but had failed to explore the
defense with his client. Counsel's incompetence arose in his failure to move
for a court-appointed psychiatrist to advise him regarding appropriateness
of an insanity defense under section 3006A(e) of title 18 of the United
States Code, which provides for appointment of experts by the court to
assist in the defense of indigent federal defendants. 169 Stressing the
"particularly critical interrelation between expert psychiatric assistance
and minimally effective representation of counsel"' 70 the court pointed out
that the seriousness of the charges (carnal knowledge of a young girl and
distribution of certain drugs), lack of tactical risk in raising the defense (the
state's case was otherwise proved by clear evidence), evidence of mental
problems of the defendant, and lack of any objection by the defendant to
use of the defense highlighted counsel's incompetence in his failure to
explore the issue. The case, however, nowhere holds that counsel was
167. The American Bar Association has said that it is the lawyer's duty to advise the client fully
after investigating a case. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 5.1 at 233 (Approved Draft
1971).
168. The generally accepted standard forjudging whether the assistance rendered by counsel was
incompetent is whether "the trial was a farce, or a mockery ofjustice, or was shocking to the conscience
of the reviewing court, or the purported representation was only perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, a
pretense, or without adequate opportunity for conference or preparation." See, e.g., Williams v. Beto,
354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1964); Bouchard v. United States, 344 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1965); United
States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1964); Tahl v. O'Connor, 336 F. Supp. 576,581
(S.D. Cal. 1971). Other recent cases have stated the test to be whether "the claimed inadequacy [is] a
serious incompetency that falls measurably below the performance ordinarily expected of fallible
lawyers" and whether "counsel's inadequacy affected the outcome of the trial." United States v.
Decoster, 48 U.S.L.W. 2070 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc). Decoster focuses upon counsell's duty to
investigate prior to trial. See also Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89,315 N.E.2d 878 (1974).
169. Springer v. Collins, 444 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Md. 1977) rev'd, 586 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 923 (1979). See also United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1974); Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967);
Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963); Wood v.
Zahradnick, 430 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1978.
170. Springer v. Collins, 444 F. Supp. 1049, 1057 (D. Md. 1977).
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bound to actually raise the defense after exploring its possible use. In fact,
it recognizes that trial tactics could dictate an attorney's ultimate decision
not to advance the insanity defense. 171
C. The Appropriate Practical Approach for the
Defense Attorney Who Disagrees with His
Client on Use of the Insanity Defense
The key to representing a criminal defendant who is or may be
mentally ill is deciding whether the defendant is competent. While this
decision may be complex and may necessitate reliance on expert advice,
once it is made, either by counsel or, if brought to the court's attention, by
the court, counsel's course regarding use of the insanity defense (or plea) is
relatively simple. A competent defendant should be permitted to make this
decision. Unless he retains this right, the concept of competency itself lacks
meaning. As already discussed, no reported case holds that defense counsel
has a duty to insert the insanity defense into the case against a client's
wishes.
On the other hand, if the defendant is incompetent to stand trial,
defense counsel should hold the insanity defense question in abeyance until
the defendant is returned to competency, just as he would other defense
decisions, and should make every effort to assure that the defendant is
properly treated and returned to competency quickly.
Defense counsel's duty is to investigate the insanity defense as
thoroughly as he believes the case warrants, as he would with any other
possible defense. To some extent, the extent of his investigation may be
governed by his client's early enthusiasm for or rejection of the defense.
The result of the investigation, which may include a psychiatric
examination, the consequences of a successful insanity defense, and the
consequences of other defense approaches should then carefully be
discussed with the defendant. Ultimately, it should be the defendant's
choice.
When a defendant objects to the use of the insanity defense but his
counsel advises it, there are a few courses of action that the attorney can
take to protect both himself and his client from later problems that may
flow from his client's decision. First, he should make a record of the fact
that he fully informed the defendant of the possible results of his decision
not to rely on the defense, namely that he risks conviction and sentence in
the case of a not guilty plea, or that he risks a prison sentence, in the case of
a guilty plea. This he can do either by a note in the file or a letter to his
client.172 He should also record that he investigated use of the defense so
that he does not become labeled as having rendered incompetent assistance
resulting from a petition for post-conviction relief.
171. Id. at 1059.
172. See ABA STANDARDS, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 167, at 241; Note, Effective
Assistance of Counselfor the Indigent Defendant, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1434, 1446(1965).
[Vol. 41:637
INSANITY DEFENSE
Another possible, although less satisfactory course, is for the attorney
to raise the issue of insanity despite his client's wishes, but first to move for
bifurcation of the trial so that the issue of guilt is submitted to the jury
before any consideration of the defendant's sanity. Only if the defendant's
other defenses fail and he is found to have performed the act charged
would the issue of his non-responsibility for the crime thus be placed in
issue. In this way, interference with trial tactics would be avoided. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals has said that even when no specific
statutory provision exists for bifurcation, it is within the inherent power of
the courts to control the order of a criminal trial. The court noted that this
power has roots deep within the common law. 173 The court also pointed to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b), which permits courts to order a
separate trial on any issue to avoid prejudice to the defendant.
It should be clear that this second approach only answers a de-
fendant's objections based on trial tactics. It does not cure other possible
objections to the defense, such as a fear of hospitalization or a reluctance to
concede "guilt" under any circumstances. Furthermore, it does not cure
the problem that arises when the defendant desires to plead "guilty"
instead of "not guilty," whether out of a desire for punishment 174 or a desire
to avoid a long public trial, or for any other reason.
V. DUTY OF THE PROSECUTOR
There seem to be no reported decisions holding that the prosecutor
must insist upon the interjection of the insanity defense when he finds
evidence of mental illness, although it can be argued that the prosecutor
has an ethical duty to come forward with such evidence of lack of guilt, as
he should with any other exculpatory evidence. 175 The United States
Supreme Court has declared that the prosecutor is not the "representative
of an ordinary party . . . but of a sovereignty . . . whose interest in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be
done."' 176 Some state statutes do permit the prosecution to interject the
insanity defense into the case. 1
77
173. Holmes v. United States, 363 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also United States v. Bradley,
463 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Ashe, 427 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Springer v.
Collins, 44 F. Supp. 1049, 1064 n.1 I (D. Md. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 586 F.2d 329 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 923 (1979).
174. When this reason is given for wishing to plead guilty in any case, regardless of any insanity
defense issue, defense counsel should be alerted that his client may not be competent to plead guilty.
175. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213,216 (1942); ABA
PROJECT ON MINIMAL STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3.1 1(a) (Approved draft 1971).
The ABA Standards do not require the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to the court
directly, but rather only to defense counsel. Hence, under these Standards, if the evidence suggested
lack of responsibility, the defendant would have control of the decision whether to utilize it. Consistent
with this, in Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963), the court held that it was a violation of due
process for the prosecution not to turn over to defense counsel results of a psychiatric examination
showing that the defendants lacked responsibility for the crime.
176. Bergerv. United States, 295 U.S. 78,88 (1935).
177. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-20-01 (1974). See State v. Katsoulis, 148 N.W. 2d 269 (N.D.
1967) (applying the statute).
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While an argument can be made that it is not improper for the
prosecutor to introduce evidence of non-responsibility of the defendant, 178
the Supreme Court has made clear that if the defense is imposed upon an
unwilling defendant and if an acquittal on insanity grounds ensues, the
defendant may then be subject to commitment, if at all, only through
regular civil commitment procedures.1 79 This should be as true if the
prosecution inserts the issue into the case as if the trial judge does so, since
the analysis in Lynch is applicable in either case.
The better practice for the prosecutor who sees an issue of
non-responsibility would be to bring the evidence to the attention of
defense counsel rather than to the attention of the court. 180 This approach
would leave the final decision to the defense. Having the issue forced on the
defense by the prosecutor poses the same problems as occur when the court
interjects it on its own motion. 8'
VI. CONCLUSION
The insanity defense, initiated as a humane option to save mentally ill
persons from the otherwise likely penal consequences of their criminal
acts,' 82 should not, in the name of "justice," be converted by courts,
prosecutors, and defendants' own attorneys into a bludgeon against the
mentally ill. If competent, a defendant should not be forced to exercise
constitutional rights that he would be better off without.8 3 Just as a
178. See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705,733 (1962) (Clark, J., dissenting).
179. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
180. See Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963).
181. For a discussion of the British practice, which refuses to allow the insanity issue to be raised
by the prosecution, see Arens, supra note 44, at 16-17.
As pointed out by one commentator, allowing the prosecution to make decisions regarding a
defendant's defense could lead to major injustice:
One is bound to add that the insanity defense is by no means the only defense which
could be used by the prosecution to defeat the interests of the defendant. The prosecution, for
example, could assert with equal ease the defense of alibi. Thus, a guilty plea to a traffic
violation might be barred upon the representation by the prosecution that the defense of alibi
should be submitted to the court. Following the procedure, condoned by the Court of
Appeals in Lynch, the prosecution might then attempt to show that the defendant could not
have been guilty of the violation in question because precisely at the time of the alleged
violation he was engaged in sabotaging military installations, attending a meeting called by a
Communist-infiltrated group, or keeping an illicit tryst with a neighbor's wife.
While, of course, no conviction could be obtained under such circumstances, the
deprivation inflicted upon the defendant by this "defense" would constitute punishment
infinitely more severe than any that could be inflicted after conviction upon the charge in
question. This is transformation of the accusatorial into the inquisitorial system of justice
without even the safeguards of the latter.
Arens, supra note 44, at 17.
182. Some commentators suggest, however, that the insanity defense was actually designed to
serve as a preventive, detention mechanism for those who could not be convicted because of the
absence of mens rea. Such persons, without the insanity defense, would walk away free. With
interposition of the defense, however, society could detain the defendant, despite an acquittal.
Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"- Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853,865,868 (1963).
183. As Mr. Justice Brandeis once said:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel
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competent adult cannot, in our free society, be made to accept medical
treatment that he does not desire, likewise this society should not sanction
the paternalistic view that he can be forced to exercise legal rights that he
judges will be detrimental to him.
As this Article has attempted to demonstrate, precedent, logic, and
policy are weak for court, prosecutor or defense counsel to usurp a fully
informed defendant's decision whether to claim non-responsibility for his
crime.184 In only the narrowest and most carefully defined circumstances
should a court be permitted to impose an insanity defense on a defendant
who is competent for trial but not competent to voluntarily and knowingly
decide how to defend his case. The consequences of that decision are
simply too personal, too serious, and perhaps life-long.
invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,479 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
184. It is interesting to note that in England it is entirely up to the defendant whether to raise the
insanity defense. See G. WILLIAM, CRIMINAL LAw 448 (2d ed. 1961).

